BOOK REVIEWS

CAUSALITY: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. By David J. Kalupahana. Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii, 1975. 188 pp. + Notes, Bibliography, Index of Chinese Terms, and General Index
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY: A Historical Analysis. By David J. Kalupahana. Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii, 1976. 152 pp. + Appendices + Index.

David J. Kalupahana, Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, has written two books on Buddhist philosophy: *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* and *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis* (hereafter cited as *Causality* and *Philosophy*, respectively). The first book, *Causality*, is mainly concerned with the doctrines of causation in early Buddhist teachings. The second, *Philosophy*, is chiefly devoted to an examination of the first phase in the history of Buddhist philosophy. In both works, the author commands excellent knowledge of Pali texts and reflects his ability to clearly set forth complex and significant ideas buried deep within them. His arguments are straightforward and simple in style, and his theories are plain, explicit, and without ambiguity, thus allowing easy access for the general reader.

The author demonstrates sound knowledge of Chinese as well. A few mistakes (*e.g.*, *hsiang ying yin* and *t'ung lui yin* [*Causality*, p. 60] should be interchanged; *vivaṭṭa*, *pien* [*Causality*, pp. 111, 245] should be *vivaṭṭa*, *ch'eng* 成) do not prevent us from estimating positively his conversance in Chinese Buddhist texts. It is a fact that comparative studies of the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas have been much facilitated by the publication of the catalogues by Anesaki and Akanuma[1] that list the sūtras contained in these two bodies of early Buddhist literature. Even then, it proves no easy task to find the translations corresponding to a particular sūtra in the Āgama or the Nikāya which lay in portions other

[1] Masaharu Anesaki, *The Four Buddhist Āgamas in Chinese* (Tokyo, 1908); and Chizen Akanuma, *The Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas* [*Kan-pa shibu shiagon goshōroku* 漢巴四部四阿含互照錄] (Nagoya, 1929).

than the Āgama section[2] of the voluminous Chinese Sūtra Piṭaka (e.g., *Causality*, p. 210, note 19).

For the study of early Buddhist thought, the author recognizes the importance of the Chinese Āgamas on two points: first, to confirm the authenticity of some of the major concepts in the Pali Nikāyas, and second, to throw light on some of the more obscure concepts found in the Pali Nikāyas (*Causality*, p. xi; *Philosophy*, p. xi-xii). According to Kalupahana, the teachings of the Buddha preserved in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas show no significant differences although the theories and discussions in the Abhidharma Piṭaka of the major schools in later times vary considerably from one another (*Philosophy*, p. xii; *Causality*, p. 147). However, we cannot always be as confident as the author is of the genuine nature of the Āgamas and Nikāyas as the source material for early Buddhist thought. We do not necessarily think they mutually agree so well as he says with regard to what they embody as doctrines in the whole. We know, for example, that important passages in the Chinese version have no corresponding passage in the Pali, and in those cases of divergence we find more often than not reflections of sectarian views of the respective school in which those doctrines were handed down. A passage the author quotes from the Aṅguttara Nikāya, for instance, to prove that *karma* is defined as volition, *cetanā* (*Causality*, p. 217, note 76) gravely differs from the corresponding passage found in the Madhyama Āgama (T 1.600a), the latter being quoted in the Abhidharmakośa to define *karma* in a different sense: *due karmaṇī cetanā karma cetayitvā ca* (Pradhan ed., p. 192). Another passage quoted and considered by the author to be "the germ of the theory of the Yogacārins stated in the Laṅkāvatāra" (*Causality*, p. 121) has no corresponding passage in any part of the Chinese Āgamas and its authenticity is denied by the Sarvāstivādin scholar Saṅghabhadra (T 29.733b). A passage quoted by Stcherbatsky from the Saṃyukta Āgama (T 2.91b) in reference to the Sarvāstivādin theory of "*sarvam asti*" (*Causality*, p. 76) has no correspondence with any sutta of the Pali Nikāyas. Thus to be "very optimistic about the attempt to determine the nature of pre-Abhidharma Buddhism" (*Philosophy*, p. xii), would be to completely leave out of consideration the problem of sectarian elements in the Theravāda Nikāyas, in the Sarvāstivādin Saṃyukta and Madhyama Āgamas, as well as the other Āgamas in Chinese belonging to yet undetermined sectarian lines.

In both books, one of the author's conclusions is that empiricism is the basis of early Buddhist epistemology (*Causality*, p. 199; *Philosophy*, p. 24); that is, the Buddha confined himself to that which is empirically given, rejecting an Absolute or a transempirical reality (*Causality*, p. 185). For the Buddha "everything"

[2] The Chinese Sūtra Piṭaka comprises twenty-one volumes in the Taishō edition, of which the first two volumes are the Āgama section.

consists of the six senses and their corresponding six objects, other things being beyond the sphere of experience (*Philosophy*, pp. 23–24). The conception of nirvana, therefore, is to be examined solely in terms of its empirical aspect (*Philosophy*, p. 69). Nirvana is, the author argues, a state of perfect mental health, of perfect happiness, calmness or coolness, attained in this life, or while one is alive (*Causality*, p. 180). The argument is convincing in itself, but questions still remain: first, why the two aspects of nirvana, *sa-upādisesa* and *an-upādisesa*, are differentiated; and, second, what the significance of the term *parinirvāṇa* ("nirvana attained with death," *Philosophy*, p. 71) is? The author's explanation on these points with reference to the distinction between nirvana and *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, "the state of cessation of perception and feeling" (*Philosophy*, p. 74*f.*), leaves something to be desired.

Regarding the theory of causality, the author refers to the synonymous usage of the terms *hetu* and *pratyaya* in early Buddhist literature (*Causality*, p. 57 *f.*). Here he points out that it was the Sarvāstivādin school that first distinguished between *hetu* and *pratyaya* as causes and conditions, or as chief causes and subcauses. This, however, is not quite true. For the Sarvāstivādins as well, they are synonymous: both sixfold *hetu* and fourfold *pratyaya* in Sarvāstivādin theory cover the same totality of causes. The difference is simply in terms of classification—when causes are divided into six they make sixfold *hetu*, when divided into four, fourfold *pratyaya*. The quotation in the Abhidharmakośa from the Saṃyukta Āgama (*tathā cakṣur bhikṣo hetū rūpāṇi pratyayaś cakṣurvijñānasyotpādāya*) is mentioned by the author as evidence of a distinction between *hetu* and *pratyaya* (*Causality*, p. 61). He seems quite right in view of the corresponding passage in Pali: *cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ*. He overlooks, however, the sentence just succeeding the quotation in the Abhidharmakośa (Pradhan ed., p. 464): *ye hi hetavo ye pratyayā vijñānasyotpādāya te 'pyanityāḥ*. This is more or less consistent with what is found in the Pali Saṃyutta Nikāya: *yo pi hetu yo pi paccayo viññāṇassa uppādāya so pi anicco* (S 2.23). What distinction is there here between *hetu* and *pratyaya*?

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